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Ahold signs on to a programme for farmworkers’ labour 
rights 
On the 29th of July 2015, the Dutch retailer Ahold announced 
a historic agreement with the Coalition of Immokalee Work-
ers (CIW), a migrant farmworkers’ organisation in Florida’s 
tomato fields. Being signatory of the CIW’s Fair Food Program 
(FFP) implies the following: Ahold-USA commits to a wage 
premium in its supply chain in the form of a ‘penny per 
pound’ of harvested tomatoes, compliance with the Fair 
Food Code of Conduct, the provision of worker-to-worker 
education sessions, a worker-triggered complaint resolution 
mechanism, as well as the establishment of health and safety 
committees on every participating farm. 
The retailer’s participation represents a quantum leap to-
wards decent work for workers who are disadvantaged rela-
tive to most other US wage and salary workers on the basis of 
their poverty, occupational hazards, their vulnerability to un-
employment and their irregular immigration status (Kandel 
2008). 
The agreement marks a U-turn for Ahold. Since 2010, the 
company had responded to the CIW’s Campaign for Fair Food 
with a ‘slow NO’. During shareholder meetings and in public 
statements, the retailer had denied responsibility for farm-
worker wages in their suppliers’ fields, arguing that enforce-
ment of labour standards is the duty of US public bodies. In 
addition, it maintained that its own Standards of Engage-
ment for suppliers were sufficient to guarantee fair and digni-
fied working conditions in its supply chain, and that it already 
sources from growers who participate in the FFP - without 
disclosing, though, who those tomato growers are. 
How then did a bunch of ‘nobodies’ (Bowe 2008), paid sub-
poverty wages, who are marginalized not just by the eco-
nomic and social status of their work, but also on the basis of 
their race and immigration status, manage to challenge a 
large multinational like Ahold? 
Precarious farmworkers’ power potentials 
Wright (2000) distinguishes two sources of workers’ power: 
‘Associational power’ resulting from the formation of work-
ers’ collective organisations, and ‘structural power’ which em-
anates from workers’ location within the economic system. 
Clearly, the challenge that precarious farmworkers have 
posed to retail giants like Ahold is rooted in the strength of 
the CIW, which has organised around tomato pickers’ rights 
at work since the early 1990s. What was central to their asso-
ciational power was the determination of the leaders of 
the coalition and the collective farmworker identity that 
was forged, which transcended ethnic divisions (Walsh 
2005). According to the CIW, putting workers’ agency at 
the centre is the key to the FFP’s success: “The Fair Food 
Program is a workers’ rights program that is designed, 
monitored, and enforced by the workers whose rights it 
is intended to protect.” (CIW 2014). It labels this ap-
proach Worker-driven Social Responsibility (WSR) - in 
contrast to corporate-led CSR approaches to non-
governmental labour regulation that aim at solving 
companies’ public relations crises. 
Initially, the Coalition used strikes to demand wage in-
creases, some form of collective bargaining and more 
humane conditions in the tomato fields where debt 
bondage, intimidation, beatings, pistol-whippings etc., 
had been common (Drainville 2008). The perishability of 
the product made work stoppage to have deleterious 
consequences on product quality and sales, making 
growers vulnerable and providing workers with structur-
al power. Yet, their poverty exposes farmworkers to the 
risk of income and employment loss as a consequence 
of strikes. The US Department of Labor estimated that 
thirty per cent of all farmworkers had below poverty 
family incomes. The majority of them were not covered 
by unemployment benefits. It probably was due to this 
income and employment insecurity why, despite the 
CIW’s efforts and the resulting greater visibility of Flori-
da’s farmworkers, the Coalition was unable to signifi-
cantly raise wages or even force growers to the negotiat-
ing table through strikes. 
In 2001, the organisation changed its strategy and start-
ed targeting fast food and supermarket chains as the 
most powerful actors in the food chain. It led to the 
CIW’s boycott of the fast food chain Taco Bell in 2001. 
From 2005 onwards, subsequent campaigns had target-
ed McDonalds, Burger King and others. Through con-
certs, cross-country speaking tours to the headquarters 
of food corporations, a consumer boycott, hunger 
strikes etc. (Drainville 2008), they demanded improve-
ments in wages and wider working conditions from 
branded buyers that would be passed down to Immoka-
lee workers through tomato growers.  
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The participation of allies (such as student, environmental, 
sustainable food and agriculture organisations, community, 
human and labour rights activists, as well as people of faith 
from various traditions, who have mobilised jointly with Im-
mokalee farmworkers) has played a key role to address the 
Achilles heel of precarious workers’ poverty. Brookes (2013: 
192) refers to this resource as ‘coalitional power’, the “[…] 
capacity of workers to expand the scope of conflict by in-
volving other, nonlabor actors willing and able to influence 
an employer’s behaviour”. This strengthened precarious 
workers’ power by shifting the pressure from brands’ supply 
to their reputation and, hence, sales. As a result, farmwork-
ers’ ability to hit brands at the soft spot of their repute, 
through their consumer-targeting campaigns, gave struc-
tural power to them. 
Precarious farmworkers’ pressure translated into a business 
case for signing on to the FFP for Ahold. This process was set 
in motion through the two-legged strategy of mobilising 
groups of critical consumers and targeting market leaders in 
their Campaign for Fair Food. Ahold’s reputation as a retailer 
who takes seriously its responsibility towards all those who 
are impacted by its business was at stake due to the in-
crease in solidarity actions of CIW allies in the Netherlands. 
More importantly, the CIW’s struggles have made a dent 
into the norms governing labour in the US fast food and re-
tail chains. Such cascading of labour rights-related norms 
has not been a natural process, but was rather influenced 
strategically. With Taco Bell, the CIW actively targeted a sub-
sidiary of one of the most influential fast food corporations 
in the US. Taco Bell later took the lead in bringing on board 
other companies in the Yum Brands conglomerate to com-
mit to the CIW demands. The CIW uses market leaders’ par-
ticipation for wider acceptance of the norms incorporated in 
its Fair Food Code of Conduct. Vis-à-vis non-participating 
companies, it argues that they should sign on to the FFP to 
avoid lagging behind their competitors. The fact that an in-
dustry leader such as Walmart voluntarily reached out to the 
CIW in 2014 can be seen as an indication of a ‘tipping point’ 
regarding what is considered an acceptable standard for 
labour governance in the retail supply chain. In principle, 
the CIW’s agreements with buyers could be enforced by pri-
vate litigation. The underpinning by contract law adds credi-
bility to these new norms institutionalised in the FFP, unlike 
most private regulatory initiatives that lack legally enforcea-
ble mechanisms. 
Conclusion 
To-date 14 major fast food chains and food retailers have 
joined the FFP. Significant improvements in the conditions 
in Florida tomato fields, and now along the entire southeast 
coast of the US, are now visible. Among others, workers re-
ceived nearly US$15 million in wage premiums since 2011, 
and no cases of forced labour and sexual assault were re-
ported on participating farms (FFSC 2014). The programme 
has received praise as the best workplace-monitoring pro-
gramme in the US. 
The CIW’s successes in empowering and protecting some of 
the most precarious workers in the US have emerged in the 
very specific context of a value chain in which the perisha-
ble product and the visible buyer give structural power to 
workers. Nonetheless their model of worker-driven social 
responsibility can inspire workers’ movements elsewhere. 
Some general lessons concern the role of coalitional power 
as a tool to address precarious workers’ vulnerability to the 
effects of strike, but first and foremost, that precarious work-
ers can revert their subordination to a logic of profit maximi-
sation if their agency is the starting point of alternative 
forms of labour rights guarantees. 
1 This column is based on the chapter ‘Civic Innovation in Value Chains: 
Towards Workers as Agents in Non-governmental Labour Regulation’ (co-
authored by Jeroen Merk and Peter Knorringa), forthcoming in Kees Bie-
kart, Wendy Harcourt and Peter Knorringa (eds) Exploring Civic Innovation 
for Social and Economic Transformation. Abingdon: Routledge. 
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